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Abstract
We experimentally analyze the role of speculators, who have no use value for the objects
on sale, in auctions. The environment is a uniform-price sealed-bid auction for 2 identical
objects, followed by a free-form bargaining resale market. There is always one positive-value
bidder, and either one to two speculators who may choose whether to enter the auction.
We show that the bidder accommodates speculators by reducing demand in the auction
and subsequently purchasing in the resale market, which encourages entry by speculators.
The presence of multiple speculators induces each speculator to enter less often, but increases
competition in the auction and the auction price. Speculators earn positive prots on average,
except when multiple speculators enter the auction.
JEL Classication: D44, C90.
Keywords: speculators, entry, multi-object auctions, resale, economic experiments.
We would like to thank seminar participants at 2014 ESA Fort Lauderdale meeting, the University of Innsbruck
and the University of St. Gallen. We would also like to thank Philip Brookins for research assistance, members
of the xs/fs group for use of the laboratory at Florida State University, and the International Foundation for
Research in Experimental Economics (IFREE) for funding this project.
yDepartment of Economics and CSEF, Università di Napoli Federico II, Via Cintia (Monte S. Angelo), 80126
Napoli, Italy. Email: pagnozzi@unina.it.
zGeorge Herbert Walker School of Business and Technology, Webster University Geneva, Route de Collex 15,
CH-1293 Bellevue, Switzerland, and CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne. Email: kjsaral@webster.ch.
1. Introduction
Many real-life auctions are characterized by the possibility of post-auction resale and the presence
of speculators  participants who have no use value for the items on sale who participate with
the intention of reselling to bidders with positive values. Prominent examples of auctions where
speculators are known to exist include auctions for spectrum licenses, commodities, and tradable
emissions permits.1
It may seem paradoxical that a speculator could win an auction  why would a bidder
with a positive use value ever let a speculator win only to purchase from him after the auction?
However, such behavior is not surprising in a multi-object auction: bidders with positive use
values may prefer to let speculators acquire some of the items on sale, because accommodating
speculators may allow them to reduce the auction price. Indeed, demand reduction behavior
in multi-object auctions is observed even without resale or speculators (Kagel and Levin, 2001;
Engelmann and Grimm, 2009). And the incentive to reduce demand is stronger when resale is
allowed, because while the presence of a resale market encourages speculative behavior, it also
provides a second opportunity for non-speculative bidders to purchase items lost in the auction
(Pagnozzi, 2010).
Moreover, when bidders strategically reduce demand, additional speculators may be at-
tracted to the auction by the possibility of positive prot.2 In this case, however, competition
between speculators reduces bidders incentive to reduce demand, since this strategy may no
longer result in a lower auction price.
These considerations raise a number of questions that we aim to explore using a combination
of theoretical and experimental analysis. How do bidders react to the presence of speculators
in auctions: do they recognize the incentive for strategic demand reduction, or do they compete
aggressively against speculators? Can speculators obtain positive prot by participating in an
auction? How do speculators decide whether to participate when it is costly to do so? Is
a speculators strategy a¤ected by the potential presence of competing speculators? These
questions have direct consequences for both the sellers revenue in the auction and the e¢ ciency
of the allocation.
To address these issues, we consider a simple environment consisting of a sealed-bid uniform-
price auction with two identical items on sale followed by a resale market. There are two
asymmetric players: a speculator with no use value for the items and a bidder who has a positive
use value for both units. The speculator chooses whether to participate in the auction against
the bidder or earn an outside option. This environment is then extended to two speculators who
simultaneously choose whether to enter the auction.
Although there are multiple equilibria in this environment, we highlight that with one specu-
lator in the auction there is an equilibrium in which both the speculator and bidder bid a positive
1See, for example, the discussion of the European Emission Trading Scheme in Mougeot et al. (2011).
2Xu, Levin, and Ye (2013) highlight that resale naturally induces a speculative motivation for entry.
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price only for a single item, so that each player wins one item at price zero. After the auction,
the speculator resells to the bidder and obtains positive prot. Therefore, in this equilibrium
the bidder reduces demand and accommodates the speculator. This equilibrium maximizes joint
playersprot and we conjecture that it may be the focal point for actual behavior. By contrast,
when there are multiple speculators in the auction, the bidder has a weaker incentive to reduce
demand and competition is likely to reduce speculatorsprot to zero.
Entry choices by speculators depend on their expectations about the outcome of the auction
and the resale market. If a risk neutral speculator expects the bidder to accommodate him in
the auction and allow him to earn more than the outside option, then he always enters when
there is no other potential speculator. Multiple speculators, on the other hand, may not obtain
positive prot by always entering the auction and may use mixed strategies to coordinate entry
in a symmetric equilibrium.
Our empirical analysis is based on an economic experiment whose design mimics the theoret-
ical environment.3 In the post-auction resale market, the speculator(s) and bidder are allowed to
make multiple o¤ers and communicate through computerized chat to trade the items won by a
speculator in the auction.4 The baseline treatment consists of the bidder and a single speculator
who are automatically entered into the auction. The remaining two treatments introduce entry
choice by speculator(s) and vary the number of speculators.
We nd strong evidence that bidders do accommodate speculators, even when multiple spec-
ulators are in the market. Bidders bid signicantly less aggressively on the second unit than on
the rst. Conditional on a speculator entering the auction, approximately 85% of all auctions
result in the resale market opening because a speculator wins at least 1 item, and speculators
manage to resell 82% of the items that they acquire. In auctions with a single speculator, the
most frequent outcome is the predicted split of the two items between the speculator and the
bidder, but average auction prices are strictly positive. This indicates that players reduce de-
mand in the auction to soften competition, but not enough to reduce the auction price to zero.
Speculators obtain positive prots on average in all treatments, except when two speculators
enter the auction, in which case competition results in negative prots for speculators and the
lowest prots for the bidder. Speculatorsprots are highest when only one of multiple poten-
tial speculators enters the auction, while the bidders prots are highest when there is only one
speculator who may enter.
Accommodating bidders and speculatorsprots did encourage entry: in single speculator
markets speculators entered in 79% of the auctions. In multiple speculator markets, each spec-
ulator entered less often than in single speculator markets, but the percentage of auctions with
3We use an experiment rather than eld data for a number of reasons including the di¢ culty of measuring
values and controlling for the entry choice of speculators. Moreover, there are very few eld data on post-auction
resale markets.
4The design of the resale market is a modied version of the free-form bargaining game used in Pagnozzi and
Saral (2015, 2016), that allows to trade two units and the participation of up to three players. Murnighan and
Roth (1977) also study a bargaining game with restricted communication between three players, where only a
single trade is allowed.
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at least one speculator was even higher (87%) and auctions with two speculators were most
common (47%).
Summing up, our main result is that when resale is allowed after a multi-object auction,
speculators manage to win against a standard bidder and then resell, thus earning positive
prot. This induces speculators to participate to the auction. Competition among speculators,
however, tends to induce too many speculators to participate in the auction, which erodes their
prot.
The sellers revenue in the auction is higher when the bidder does not reduce demand and
wins both units, especially when he competes with two speculators. The sellers revenue is also
higher in markets with multiple speculators, even if only one of them enters the auction. Auction
e¢ ciency is relatively low due to demand reduction and while resale increases e¢ ciency after
the auction, it does not always ensure an e¢ cient allocation of the items on sale.
Given the potential for losses and competition between speculators, we nd a prominent
role for risk preferences and selection with multiple speculators. Speculators with a higher
risk tolerance are more likely to enter and bid more aggressively after previous losses, which
signicantly increases maximum bids in the current auction. More aggressive speculators leads
to the highest speculator earnings in these markets, but also to the highest probability of losses.
Our paper contributes to the experimental literature on auctions with resale.5 Experiments
on single-object auctions with resale include Georganas (2011), Georganas and Kagel (2011),
Lange et al. (2011), Saral (2012), and Chintamani and Kosmopoulou (2015), while Filiz-Ozbay et
al. (2015) and Pagnozzi and Saral (2016) analyze multi-object auctions with resale. Throughout
this literature, the focus is on the impact of resale on the strategies of bidders with positive use
values for the items on sale. By contrast, we analyze entry and bidding strategies of speculators.
Most closely related to our paper is the examination of emission permits markets by Mougeot
et al. (2011). The authors analyze the role of speculators in breaking collusion in sealed-bid and
ascending multi-unit auctions and show that bidders are more likely to collude and accommodate
speculators in an ascending rather than in a sealed-bid auction. While Mougeot et al. (2011)
highlight di¤erences in auction formats, we focus on the response of bidders and speculators to
entry choices by speculators and to changes in the number of speculators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical analysis of the
model that we refer to for our experiments. Section 3 discusses the experimental design, and
Section 4 presents the results for entry, bidding and resale. Finally, Section 5 concludes. The
Appendix contains proofs of the propositions, instructions and screenshots.
2. Theoretical Framework
Model Consider a (sealed-bid) uniform-price auction for 2 units of an identical good, with no
reserve price. Each player submits 2 non-negative bids (possibly di¤erent), one for each unit
5See Kagel and Levin (2011) for a survey of the experimental literature on auctions.
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on sale; the 2 highest bids are awarded the units, and the winner(s) pay a price equal to the
3rd-highest bid for each unit. At the end of the auction, players observe the auction price but
not their competitorsbids.
There is a bidder who is privately informed about his valuation vB  U [50; 100], which is
the same for each unit on sale, and there are either 1 or 2 speculators who have valuation equal
to zero for the units on sale, which is common knowledge. Hence, players know the e¢ cient
allocation of the units on sale before the auction.6
The bidder is always present in the auction, while speculators choose whether to enter the
auction. Speculators have an outside option equal to c > 0, that they lose if they participate
in the auction. The outside option may be interpreted as an alternative opportunity that a
speculator misses in order to participate in an auction, or as a measure of bidding costs (for
example, costs that have to be paid to convince investors of the opportunity to participate in
an auction for speculative reasons, even if the objects on sale have no use value). All players are
risk neutral.
A speculator who wins a unit in the auction can resell it to the bidder in a resale market.
We assume that resale takes place through a generic (and un-modelled) bargaining mechanism
between players. Let r be the actual resale price at which a speculator and the bidder trade as
a result of post-auction bargaining with one-sided incomplete information, where the seller has
value 0 and the buyer is privately informed about his value, which is uniformly distributed on
[50; 100].7 To make the model interesting, we assume that the expected resale price is E [r] > c,
otherwise a speculator does not enter the auction even if he expects to win an object at price 0.
There is demand reduction if the bidder bids less than his valuation for the second unit and
bids more for the rst unit than for the second unit (see, e.g., Wilson, 1979, and Ausubel and
Cramton, 1998), while there is speculation if a speculator bids a positive price for a unit.
Auction with 1 Speculator First suppose that only one speculator enters the auction, so
that there are two players in total in the auction. We describe a possible equilibrium in which
the speculator manages to obtain strictly positive prot, despite competing with a bidder who
has a higher valuation.8
Proposition 1. With one speculator, the auction has an equilibrium in which the bidder bids
vB for the rst unit and 0 for the second unit and the speculator bids 50 for the rst unit and
0 for the second unit.
In this equilibrium, there is speculation by the speculator and demand reduction by the
bidder. Hence, the bidder accommodates the speculator and the speculator only bids for one
6See Garratt and Tröger (2006) for a theoretical analysis of speculation in single-object auctions.
7See Ausubel et al. (2002), who show that with one-sided incomplete information and a gap between the
sellers valuation and the support of the buyers valuation, any bargaining procedure in which players sequentially
exchange o¤ers has essentially a unique sequential equilibrium, which is stationary and in which trade occurs in
nite time. Our qualitative results are robust to many alternative models of the resale market.
8All proofs are in the Appendix.
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unit, so that players win one unit each at price 0 and then trade at price r in the resale market
(since the speculator does not learn any information about the bidders valuation in the auction).
Hence, the bidder obtains a total prot equal to 2vB   r, because he buys one unit at price 0
in the auction and one unit at price r in the resale market, and the speculator obtains a resale
prot equal to r, because he buys one unit at price 0 in the auction and sells it at price r in the
resale market. The sellers revenue in the auction is equal to 0.
In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that neither the bidder nor the speculator have an
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium described because, in order to win more than one unit,
a player has to increase the auction price so much that he reduces his prot.
Notice that there are many other equilibrium strategies that result in players winning one
unit each at price zero.9 There are also equilibria in which each player wins one unit at a strictly
positive price, but in these equilibria both players obtain a strictly lower auction prot than
in the equilibrium described in Proposition 1. Moreover, there are other equilibria in which a
player wins both units (by bidding a high price that makes it unprotable for the competitor to
win a unit, exactly as in a single-object second-price auction), so that the other player obtains
no prot in the auction. We focus on the equilibrium in which players win one unit each at
price 0 because in this equilibrium the bidder allows the speculator to win a unit, and obtains
the highest possible prot on the other unit in the auction.
Auction with 2 Speculators Even with 2 speculators in the auction there are multiple
equilibria. However, in this case there is no scope for protable demand reduction because, with
2 units on sale and 3 players, it is not possible for each player to win one unit in the auction. So
competition between speculators tends to increase the auction price up to the expected resale
price.
Proposition 2. With two speculators, the auction has an equilibrium in which one speculator
bids 100 for both units, the other speculator bids E [r] for both units, and the bidder bids 0 for
both units.
In this equilibrium, one speculator wins no unit while the other speculator wins both units at
price E [r] and then resells them at price r to the bidder (since the speculator does not learn any
information about the bidders valuation in the auction). Hence, speculators obtain no prot
from participating in the auction, regardless of whether they win the units or not. The bidder
obtains a prot equal to 2 (vB   r) from buying the units in the resale market. The sellers
revenue is higher than in the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 with only one speculator.
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that the players who win no unit in the auction have
no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium described because, in order to win a unit, they have
to increase the auction price so much that they cannot obtain positive his prot.
9These equilibria are constructed by varying playersrst-unit bid (compared to the strategies described in
Proposition 1), but still ensuring that players have no incentive to deviate by winning two units in the auction.
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Of course, there are many other equilibria with the same allocation as in the equilibrium
described in Proposition 1 but a di¤erent auction price. There are also equilibria in which the
bidder wins all the units in the auction and no speculator obtains positive prot. Because of
the presence of multiple equilibria in our environment, both with one and with two speculators,
players actual bidding behavior is ultimately an empirical question, that we analyze in our
experiments.
Entry by Speculators Suppose that a speculator expects to play the equilibrium described
in Proposition 1 if he competes in the auction against the bidder, and that speculators obtain
no prot if they both enter the auction. Therefore, when there is only one speculator, he enters
the auction since he expects to obtain a prot E [r] > c.
When there are two speculators who may enter the auction, a speculator who enters expects
to obtain a prot equal to E [r] if the other speculator does not enter, and a prot equal to 0
if the other speculator also enters. While if a speculator does not enter the auction, he always
obtains a prot equal to the outside option c. In other words, taking into account the anticipated
outcome of the auction with 1 or 2 speculators, total speculator prots in the entry game between
two speculators is
Enter Stay out
Enter 0 0 E [r] c
Stay out c E [r] c c
Therefore, the entry game has two pure-strategy asymmetric equilibria, in which one spec-
ulator enters and the other stays out. Moreover, there is a unique symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium in which each speculator enters with probability q 2 (0; 1) such that his expected
payo¤ from entering the auction is equal to the outside option  i.e.,
(1  q)E [r] = c , q  1  c
E [r]
:
Speculators enter because of the possibility of winning the auction and reselling in case they
compete only with the bidder in the auction, but they lose money if both speculators enter
the auction since they lose the outside option, and competition among speculators drives their
auction and resale prot to zero. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the probability that at least
one speculator enters the auction is

1  c2E[r]2

.
Of course, speculators have di¤erent incentives to enter if they expect to play a di¤erent
equilibrium from the one described in Proposition 1 in the auction against the bidder. Speci-
cally, if a speculator expects to win no unit against the bidder, then he never enters the auction.
Similarly, if he expects to win but pay a strictly positive price, then he enters with a lower
probability than q in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. By contrast, if he expects to win both
units, then he enters with a higher probability.
Notice that by entering the auction a speculator gives up an outside option, which is certain,
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for the possibility of obtaining positive prot in the auction, which is uncertain and depends on
the behavior of his competitor(s) in the auction and in the resale market, and on the entry choice
of the other speculator (when there are two speculators). Hence, for a risk-averse speculator
entry is less attractive than for a risk-neutral speculator and, when there are two speculators,
in a mixed-strategy equilibrium each speculator enters with a probability which is strictly lower
than q.
Summing up, the theoretical predictions of our model are the followings.
Result 1. When there is only one speculator in the auction, the bidder may reduce demand and
allow the speculator to acquire one unit and obtain positive prot.
Result 2. When there are two speculators in the auction, they may not obtain positive prot.
Result 3. When there is only one speculator, he enters the auction if he expects the bidder to
reduce demand. When there are two speculators, in a symmetric equilibrium each of them enters
with a probability which is strictly positive, but lower than one.
3. Experiment Design
The experiment design is based on the theoretical environment described above. In the baseline
treatment, 1 speculator (S) and 1 bidder (B) participate in the auction and the remaining two
treatments introduce entry choices for speculators and add an additional speculator.
In all treatments, each round had two identical items o¤ered for sale via a sealed-bid uniform-
price auction. Each auction always had 1 bidder, who randomly drew his private per-item
valuation (identical for both items) from a uniform distribution on [50; 100], and at least 1
speculator with no use value for the items. The distribution of the bidders value and the fact
that speculators had no use value were common knowledge. A subjects role as a bidder or
speculator was randomly assigned at the start of the experiment, and stayed the same for the
duration of the experiment.10 In treatments where speculators had entry choice, they decided
whether to enter the auction or earn the outside option of 10. With multiple speculators, entry
decisions were simultaneous. If no speculator entered, the bidder automatically won both units
at price zero.11
Auction participants placed one bid between 0 and 100 for each item,12 and the two highest
bids were each awarded one item at a price equal to the third-highest bid. Ties were broken
randomly. After the auction, participants were informed of the number of items they won and
the auction price. Bids were not publicly revealed. A participant who won an item in the auction
earned the di¤erence between his value and the auction price.
10To minimize labeling e¤ects, the speculator was referred to as a blue bidderand the bidder was referred to
as a green bidder.The Appendix contains instructions for all treatments and sample screenshots.
11To lower the probability of boredom driving entry decisions, speculators who chose not to enter and bidders
who won by default played an unpaid computerized version of tic-tac-toe against the computer.
12While we did not allow bidders to refrain from bidding, the instructions were clear that bidders could bid 0.
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If a speculator won at least one unit, a resale market opened where the speculator could
resell to the bidder through an unstructured bargaining game (as in Pagnozzi and Saral, 2016).13
Both the speculator and bidder could make o¤ers through a computerized o¤er board. Only
one posted o¤er per participant was allowed at a time, but o¤ers could always be changed
prior to agreement. The resale stage terminated once a participants o¤er was accepted by the
counterpart. The speculator and bidder could also send each other messages and discuss o¤ers
through anonymous chat. When two speculators won one unit each, each speculator participated
in a simultaneous and isolated bargaining game with the bidder and the two speculators could
not communicate with each other.14
Participants could exit the resale market without trading at any point, and had up to 3
minutes to agree to an o¤er. If agreement was reached, the item was resold from the speculator
to the bidder. If a single speculator won 2 items, he could sell each item at a separate price, or
bundle them at a single price. For each item resold, the speculator earned the di¤erence between
the resale price and the auction price, and the bidder earned the di¤erence between his value
and the resale price. Resale earnings were in addition to the earnings from the auction.
The experimental treatments are summarized below.
1. 1 speculator (1S): one speculator competes in the auction against the bidder.
2. 1 speculator entry (1SE): one speculator chooses whether to participate in the auction
against the bidder.
3. 2 speculators entry (2SE): two speculators choose whether to participate in the auction
against the bidder.
Each session of a treatment had 15 auction/resale rounds and, on average, 20 subjects.15 A
subject was only allowed to participate in one session of one treatment. Table 3.1 shows the
number of subjects who participated in each treatment. At the start of all sessions, we elicited
risk preferences using a mechanism adapted from Eckel and Grossman (2008). Subjects were
o¤ered a choice between ve binary 50/50 gambles with increasing expected value and risk,
so that choosing a lower gamble indicates higher risk aversion. Subjects were then randomly
assigned to roles and groups (of 2 or 3 subjects depending on the treatment) for the auction
rounds. After each round, subjects were randomly rematched into new groups. To ensure
the least amount of changes, we used the same value draws across treatments. Subjects were
13Previous experiments on auctions with resale assume a di¤erent structure for the resale market. Georganas
(2011) use a secondary auction for the resale market; Georganas and Kagel (2011) and Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2012)
utilize take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers by the auction winner; Lange et al. (2011) and Saral (2012) assume automatic
transfers to bidders with higher valuations.
14With two speculators, the bidder could make di¤erent o¤ers in each resale market and could exit one market
but remain active in the other.
15The minimum number of subjects in a session was 16 (1 session of 1SE) while the maximum was 21 (2 sessions
of 2SE).
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students at Florida State University recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment
was programmed using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
1S 1SE 2SE
Bidder (B) $20:12 $23:52 $19:16
Speculator (S) $16:51 $16:70 $15:70
Number of Subjects 40 56 60
Table 3.1: Average experiment earnings.
Payo¤s during the experiment were denominated in experimental currency units, ECUs,
which transformed into US dollars at the rate of $0.01 per ECU. Since subjects could make
losses, a bidder had an initial endowment of 50 ECUs and a speculator of 400 ECUs to hopefully
ensure that they did not have negative cumulative earnings at any point during the experiment.
We employed standard rules for dealing with bankruptcy: subjects who went bankrupt a single
time received a new endowment, while subjects who went bankrupt a second time were removed
from the session and only received the participation fee. Two subjects assigned to the bidder
role went bankrupt once (both in the rst round of the 2SE treatment), and no subjects went
bankrupt twice. Table 3.1 shows average earnings (including the $10 participation fee and lottery
earnings), by type and treatment.
4. Experiment Results
In this section, we describe the main experimental results in the order of the actual timing
of decisions: (i) entry; (ii) bidding; (iii) resale. Section 4.1 presents summary statistics that
provide a broad overview of the results. The remaining sections provide formal analysis of
observed behavior: Section 4.2 considers entry decisions by speculators; Section 4.3 bidding
behavior by speculators and bidders; Section 4.4 the resale market; Section 4.5 revenue, e¢ ciency,
and earnings.
4.1. Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 presents the frequency of entry by speculators and the resulting number of participants
in the auction in treatments 1SE and 2SE. Entry choices in the 1SE treatment were lower than
the risk neutral prediction of 100%, indicating either that speculators were risk averse or that
they expected to earn less than the outside option in the auction.16 In line with the theoretical
predictions, speculators entered less frequently in the 2SE than 1SE treatment. The number of
auction participants, n, could reach 2 in the 1SE treatment or 3 in the 2SE treatment. Despite
each speculator entering less often in the 2SE treatment, there was a high percentage of auctions
with at least 1 speculator (n=2, 3) because of the presence of multiple speculators who did not
coordinate.
16The e¤ects of risk preferences are discussed in Section 4.2.
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%
(obs)
S Enter n=1 n=2 n=3
1SE 79:1
(332)
21:0
(88)
79:1
(332)
 
2SE 67:2
(403)
13:0
(39)
39:7
(119)
47:3
(142)
Table 4.1: Frequency of S entering and number of auction participants.
Table 4.2 provides average bids, conditional on a speculator entering, where bid 1 (2) denotes
the maximum (minimum) bid placed. As bidding behavior may di¤er depending on the number
of participants, we separately consider n=2 and n=3 in the 2SE treatment. Across all treatments,
average rst unit bids are much higher than second unit bids for both speculators and bidders,
which supports the theoretical prediction of demand reduction by players. The average rst unit
bid is higher for speculators than for bidders, and reaches the highest level in the 1S treatment.
The second unit bid is higher than zero for both types.
S B
bid 1 bid 2 bid 2  10 bid 1 bid 2 bid 2  10
1S 68:9 34:0 24:7% 57:2 28:7 45:3%
1SE 60:3 36:1 11:1% 57:8 27:4 35:5%
2SE
n=2
63:3 41:0 23:5% 55:8 34:2 37:8%
2SE
n=3
66:3 42:2 18:0% 60:6 35:1 29:6%
Table 4.2: Average bids and relative frequency of equilibrium play.
While average bids provide little support for the point predictions of the theory, to evaluate
the frequency of observed behavior that weakly matches the theoretical equilibrium described
in Proposition 1 we report the percentage of second unit bids that are less than or equal to 10
in the column bid 2  10. The adherence to theory is highest in the 1S treatment for both
speculators and bidders, and overall bidders were more likely than speculators to place a low
second unit bid. In all cases, the frequency of equilibrium play for second unit bids falls below
predicted levels.
Demand reduction by bidders could result in speculators acquiring units in the auction. Table
4.3 presents the relative and absolute frequency of speculators wining 0, 1, or 2 units, conditional
on at least one speculator entering the auction. Since speculators can win all units in two ways,
2 indicates that a single speculator won both units, and (1; 1) indicates that two speculators
won one unit each in the 2SE treatment. In auctions with 1 speculator and 1 bidder, the most
frequent outcome was that each player won 1 unit, consistent with the theoretical prediction.
In the 2SE n=3 case, the most frequent outcome was that speculators won 2 units (57.1% of
auctions), indicating that bidders accommodate speculators even when two speculators enter.
The last two columns of Table 4.3 present the frequency of the resale market opening,
conditional on at least one speculator entering, and the resale success rate, dened as the
ratio between the number of units resold and the number of units in the resale market. Most
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Units won by S Resale Resale
%
(obs)
0 1 2 (1; 1) Market Success
1S 16:3
(49)
57:7
(173)
26:0
(78)
  83:7
(251)
:81
1SE 15:7
(52)
61:1
(203)
23:2
(77)
  84:3
(280)
:85
2SE
n=2
16:0
(19)
44:5
(53)
39:5
(47)
  84:0
(100)
:86
2SE
n=3
9:9
(14)
33:1
(47)
31:0
(44)
26:1
(37)
90:1
(128)
:74
Table 4.3: Frequency of units won by S; frequency of resale; resale success rate (units resold/units
won by S).
treatments have similar frequencies of the resale market opening, except for auctions with two
speculators where there was a resale market after 90% of auctions, despite the lowest resale
success rate.
Table 4.4 summarizes average auction prices and nal resale prices for auctions where at
least one speculator entered.17 Average auction prices were strictly positive, which is expected
given the average bids in Table 4.2, and were highest in the 2SE treatment, especially with three
participants. When the bidder reduced demand and won less than 2 units, auction prices were
lower than when the bidder won both units. When there was a resale market because the bidder
reduced demand, average resale prices were higher than auction prices.
Auction Price Resale Price
B won < 2 B won 2
1S 36:6 35:9 39:7 50:0
1SE 37:2 36:2 42:3 47:5
2SE
n=2
40:9 39:4 49:0 54:5
2SE
n=3
59:3 58:5 66:5 65:8
Table 4.4: Average auction and resale prices (per unit).
Table 4.5 summarizes total earnings, combining both auction and resale, conditional on at
least one speculator entering.18 A speculator could make positive earnings by purchasing a
unit in the auction and reselling it at a higher price, but losses were possible if a speculator
failed to resell.19 When one speculator entered the auction he did make positive earnings on
average, especially in the 2SE treatment. When 2 speculators entered they made losses on aver-
age, particularly when both units were won by a single speculator. Although average earnings
were lower than the outside option of 10, speculators continued to enter. To provide a more
17We omit auctions where the bidder won at price 0 because no speculator entered.
18For earnings, we exclude auctions where no speculator entered (so that speculators earned the outside option
and the bidder won at price 0). This happened 88 times (out of 420 auctions) in the 1SE treatment (21%), and
39 times (out of 261 auctions) in the 2SE treatment (13%).
19Speculators made losses in 18% of all auctions where they entered in the 1S treatment, 16% in the 1SE
treatment, 14% in the 2SEn=2 treatment, and 22% in the 2SEn=3 treatment.
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complete picture of earnings, we also report the standard deviation of earnings, the frequency
of a speculator entering and earning more than the outside option, and data restricted to the
last 5 periods of a session. All treatments have high earnings variability for speculators and the
majority of auctions where a speculator entered resulted in earnings above the outside option,
except when both speculators entered. Moreover, in the last 5 periods, speculators earned more
than the outside option on average, except when both speculators entered, which suggests that
learning plays an important role in this environment.20
Average biddersearnings were highest with a single speculator and lowest when two specu-
lators entered the auction. Similar to speculators, all treatments have high earnings variability
and higher average earnings in the last 5 periods.
Earnings S S
(last 5)
S > 10 S > 10
(last 5)
B B
(last 5)
1S 7:7
(42:0)
15:9
(40:2)
51:7% 52:0% 52:4
(45:5)
66:5
(46:9)
1SE 6:7
(33:9)
12:5
(32:2)
56:3% 64:7% 54:9
(37:7)
62:0
(36:4)
2SE  2:4
(39:2)
7:3
(40:7)
32:3% 43:4% 31:9
(37:0)
41:9
(43:2)
2SE
n=2
11:2
(45:8)
17:6
(47:5)
58:8% 67:3% 42:6
(43:5)
49:6
(48:4)
2SE
n=3
 8:1
(34:6)
 2:6
(30:1)
21:1% 20:4% 23:0
(27:8)
27:0
(25:7)
Table 4.5: Average (standard deviation) earnings conditional on S entry; frequency of S earning
more than 10. (last 5) indicates data were restricted to the last 5 rounds.
Table 4.6 shows the e¢ ciency of the auction allocation and of the nal allocation after the
resale market. Auction e¢ ciency is measured as the ratio between the sum of the use values of
the winners of the two units in the auction and the highest use value; nal e¢ ciency is measured
as the ratio between the sum of the use values of nal holders of the units and the highest use
value (so it is equal to 1 if a speculator resold the units or if the bidder won them in the auction,
and it is less than 1 if a speculator failed to resell). For comparison, the e¢ ciency of a random
allocation is :5.
E¢ ciency 1S 1SE 2SE 2SE
n=2
2SE
n=3
auction :45 :58 :41 :38 :26
nal :89 :93 :87 :91 :80
Table 4.6: Average e¢ ciency.
The low e¢ ciency of the auction allocation in all treatments indicates that units were fre-
quently won by speculators. Auction e¢ ciency is particularly low in 2SE n=3, and lower than
a random allocation in all treatments except 1SE. Resale increases e¢ ciency after the auction,
but nal e¢ ciency is always lower than 1 because of resale failure: speculators failed to resell
20We investigate learning formally through regression analysis in subsequent sections.
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19% of times in the 1S treatment, 15% in the 1SE treatment, and 25% in the 2SE treatment.
4.2. Entry
Table 4.7 examines speculators entry decisions using probit regressions with the speculator
choosing to enter the auction as the dependent variable (marginal e¤ects reported). The rst
three models use data from both entry treatments 1SE and 2SE, with 1SE as the baseline, while
the last model only uses 2SE data. In all models, we include lagged dummy variables to deter-
mine how the previous round of play inuenced entry decisions: Wint 1indicates whether the
speculator won at least 1 unit in the previous round; Lossest 1 indicates whether the speculator
made losses in the previous round; Earnt 1<10 indicates whether the speculator earned less
than the outside option in the previous round, and (n=3)t 1 indicates whether the speculator
competed with another speculator in the previous round. The variable Risk Measure (1-5) rep-
resents the gamble chosen in the Eckel-Grossman mechanism where lower numbers correspond
to higher risk aversion, and Period tracks the round of play.
The negative coe¢ cient on 2SE in models 1-3 provides robust evidence that the probability
of an individual speculator entering in the 2SE treatment was signicantly lower than in the
1SE treatment, which is consistent with Result 3.
Empirical Result 1: A speculator is less likely to enter an auction when there may be another
speculator.
The strong negative e¤ect of Period (in all models), Lossest 1 (in model 1) and Earnt 1<10
(in models 2 and 3) indicates that speculators were less likely to enter in later periods, and
after making losses or earning less than the outside option in the previous round. Winning at
least 1 unit in the previous round had a strong positive e¤ect on entry decisions. Including
interactions with the risk measure and treatment in model 3, strong di¤erences emerge for risk
tolerant speculators in the 2SE treatment, who were more likely to enter despite earning less
than 10 in the previous round.
Model 4 restricts the analysis to the 2SE treatment and shows that when a speculator was
in an auction in the previous round with another speculator, risk tolerant speculators were more
likely to enter than risk averse ones.
4.3. Bidding
4.3.1. Speculator
Figure 4.1 provides a jittered scatterplot of the two bids made by speculators across treatments,
where bid 1 (or the rst unit bid) is the highest and bid 2 (or the second unit bid) is the lowest
bid. Treatment di¤erences are most apparent in the 1SE treatment for bid 1, which appears
lowest, and in the 2SE n=3 treatment for bid 2, which appears highest.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
S Entry Choice 2SE only
2SE -0.358** -0.376** -0.373**
(0.143) (0.150) (0.154)
Risk Measure (1-5) -0.0644 -0.0676 -0.0675 -0.00679
(0.0409) (0.0429) (0.0468) (0.0301)
2SERisk Measure 0.0819* 0.0858* 0.0634
(0.0466) (0.0493) (0.0516)
Period -0.0226*** -0.0233*** -0.0225*** -0.0265***
(0.00361) (0.00380) (0.00374) (0.00549)
Wint 1 0.133*** 0.0716** 0.0662* 0.0450
(0.0386) (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0452)
Earnt 1<10 -0.0856*** -0.171*** -0.0748*
(0.0326) (0.0604) (0.0428)
Earnt 1<10Risk Measure -0.00524
(0.0226)
2SEEarnt 1<10Risk Measure 0.0540***
(0.0194)
Lossest 1 -0.192***
(0.0480)
(n=3)t 1 -0.0935
(0.0743)
(n=3)t 1Risk Measure 0.0637***
(0.0208)
Observations 952 952 952 560
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.7: Marginal e¤ects from population-averaged probit regressions with S choosing to enter
as dependent variable.
Most rst unit bids appear higher than 60, which is consistent with speculation. A number
of second units bids are at zero and almost all second unit bids are strictly lower than rst
unit bids, a di¤erence that is signicant according to a one-sided sign test on session averages
(p = 0:004). Comparing behavior between the 2SE n=2 and n=3 environments, both bid 1 and
bid 2 are lower with two speculators in the auction.
Empirical Result 2: Speculators bid positive prices for the rst unit and strictly less for the
second unit than for the rst unit.
To analyze treatment e¤ects on bids, Table 4.8 reports results from random e¤ects regressions
with bid 1 (bid 2) as the dependent variable in models 1, 3, and 5 (models 2, 4, and 6). Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. The rst two models are run on all data, with the 1S
treatment as the baseline, while the last four models only consider the entry treatments, with
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Figure 4.1: Scatterplot of Ss bids for unit 1 and unit 2.
the 1SE treatment as the baseline. In all models we include treatment dummies and, for the
2SE treatment, we di¤erentiate auctions with 2 or 3 participants.
For the rst unit bid, the main treatment di¤erence is in model 1, where bids are signi-
cantly lower in the 1SE treatment than in the 1S treatment. Coe¢ cient tests also demonstrate
treatment di¤erences between the 1SE and 2SE n=3 treatments (p = 0:028), which is conrmed
in model 3 using data restricted to the entry treatments. Model 5 examines rst unit bids in the
entry treatments by including additional controls and two dummy variables, 1 Unit Wint 1 and
2 Unit Wint 1, which indicate whether the speculator won 1 or 2 units in the previous round,
respectively. The main result is that winning one unit in the previous round (weakly) increases
bids for the st unit, while winning 2 units decreases them.
Models 2 and 4 show a weak treatment e¤ect of slightly more aggressive bids for the second
unit in the 2SE n=3 treatment. In model 6, the negative coe¢ cient on period provides evidence
that speculators bid less aggressively over time on the second unit. This indicates learning to
reduce demand, even though the constant coe¢ cient indicates that average bids are higher than
zero.
16
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1SE and 2SE only
S Bid bid 1 bid 2 bid 1 bid 2 bid 1 bid 2
1SE -10.57** 1.504
(5.066) (5.350)
2SE n=2 -4.449 5.874 6.098 4.385 5.471 6.184
(5.101) (5.835) (4.346) (4.879) (4.486) (4.947)
2SE n=3 -2.927 9.014* 7.624** 7.479* 7.288* 7.073*
(4.387) (5.088) (3.477) (3.955) (3.869) (4.284)
Risk Measure (1-5) 0.852 0.674
(1.251) (1.592)
Period -0.0534 -1.019***
(0.233) (0.270)
1 Unit Wint 1 2.184* 0.464
(1.291) (1.403)
2 Units Wint 1 -3.260** 1.470
(1.421) (1.737)
Lossest 1 -3.418 -3.375
(4.293) (7.139)
Lossest 1Risk Measure 1.285 0.221
(1.118) (1.799)
Constant 68.86*** 34.02*** 58.31*** 35.54*** 56.93*** 42.64***
(4.054) (4.418) (3.043) (3.035) (4.340) (5.245)
Observations 1,035 1,035 735 735 672 672
Number of Clusters 88 88 68 68 68 68
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Table 4.8: Random e¤ects regressions with Ss bids as dependent variables.
4.3.2. Bidder
The bidder has a strong incentive to reduce demand and accommodate a single speculator in
the auction, but this incentive is lower with two speculators. Figure 4.2 presents scatterplots of
biddersbids against values, where bid 1 (bid 2) is the highest (lowest) bid. All graphs include
a regression plot (dashed line) and a reference plot for bids equal to value (solid line).
Many rst unit bids fall slightly below value, but clustering towards value is apparent,
particularly in the 1S treatment. The regression lines indicate that bids tend to be lower than
value, and increasing in value. We run panel random regressions to test the hypothesis that
rst unit bids are equal to value. In all treatments, joints tests that the constant is 0 and the
coe¢ cient on value is 1 reject value bidding (p < 0:001).21 For the second unit, almost all bids
fall below value, and the regression line is further away from the value line, indicating stronger
21This includes breaking the 2SE treatment into separate regressions for the n = 2 and n = 3 cases. Regression
results reported in table A.1 in the appendix.
17
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
bi
d 
1
50 60 70 80 90 100
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
bi
d 
2
50 60 70 80 90 100
1S
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
bi
d 
1
50 60 70 80 90 100
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
bi
d 
2
50 60 70 80 90 100
1SE
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
bi
d 
1
50 60 70 80 90 100
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
bi
d 
2
50 60 70 80 90 100
2SEn=2
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
bi
d 
1
50 60 70 80 90 100
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
bi
d 
2
50 60 70 80 90 100
2SEn=3
value
Figure 4.2: Scatterplot of Bs bids for unit 1 and unit 2.
demand reduction on the second unit.
Consistent with Result 1 and demand reduction, the majority of rst unit bids are strictly
higher than second unit bids, which is conrmed by a one-sided sign test on session averages for
the two bids (p = 0:004). Compared to speculators, a larger number of second unit bids are at
0, which suggests that bidders were less aggressive.
Empirical Result 3: In all treatments, bidders bid less than their value for the rst unit, and
bid strictly more for the rst unit than for the second unit.
To analyze treatment e¤ects on biddersbids, Table 4.9 presents results from random e¤ects
regressions with bid 1 and bid 2 as dependent variables. Standard errors clustered at the
individual level. In addition to the variables used for speculators, we include the bidders unit
value and its interactions with treatment. The rst four models are run on all treatments, with
the 1S treatment as the baseline, and the last two models only consider the entry treatments,
with the 1SE treatment as the baseline.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1SE and 2SE only
B Bid bid 1 bid 2 bid 1 bid 2 bid 1 bid 2
vB 0.549*** 0.379*** 0.522*** 0.290*** 0.569*** 0.443***
(0.0567) (0.0655) (0.0953) (0.107) (0.0681) (0.0768)
1SE -0.525 -1.216 -9.186 -17.56*
(6.024) (5.987) (9.958) (9.394)
2SE n=2 -0.426 6.010 -10.29 -12.05 0.124 7.283
(6.577) (7.193) (9.882) (9.309) (6.438) (6.219)
2SE n=3 2.152 5.690 2.779 -9.110 2.665 6.863
(5.835) (6.511) (10.91) (13.16) (5.632) (5.393)
1SEvB 0.113 0.210
(0.134) (0.151)
2SE n=2vB 0.145 0.263*
(0.147) (0.159)
2SE n=3vB -0.0180 0.186
(0.155) (0.204)
Risk Measure (1-5) 0.897 1.089
(1.711) (1.521)
Period -0.569** -0.847***
(0.235) (0.250)
1 Unit Wint 1 1.930 1.983
(1.279) (1.443)
2 Units Wint 1 -0.399 3.137**
(1.246) (1.430)
Constant 16.59*** 0.679 21.23** 10.24 14.60** -5.307
(5.144) (5.666) (9.048) (8.956) (6.340) (5.518)
Observations 893 893 828 828 593 593
Number of Clusters 68 68 68 68 48 48
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.9: Random e¤ects regressions with Bs bids as dependent variables.
There are no signicant treatment e¤ects in models 1 or 2 (coe¢ cient tests, p > 0:198), or
in models 3 and 4 with additional controls (only the 1SE treatment is weakly signicant), or in
models 5 and 6 with data restricted to the entry treatments. The constant coe¢ cient indicates
that the average bid intercept is signicantly di¤erent from zero for bid 1, but not for bid 2.
The positive and signicant coe¢ cient on value indicates an increase in bids as value increases,
although the magnitude of this e¤ect is much lower for bid 2. All these results are consistent
with demand reduction by the bidders, in all treatments. Models 3 and 4 show a signicant
negative e¤ect of period on bids for both units, and model 4 shows that winning two units in
the previous period leads to an increase in the second unit bid.
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4.4. Resale
Table 4.10 examines the probability of a resale market opening using probit regressions, where
the dependent variable is equal to 1 if at least one unit was won by a speculator in the auction.
The rst two models consider all auctions, including those in which no speculator entered, to
examine the overall probability of resale. In model 3 we only consider auctions where at least one
speculator entered to examine the frequency of resale after entry decisions, and we distinguish
between n=2 and n=3 in the 2SE treatment. In all models, the 1S treatment serves as the
baseline.
(1) (2) (3)
Resale Market S Entered
vB -0.00428*** -0.00430*** -0.00493***
(0.000930) (0.000930) (0.000879)
1SE -0.169*** -0.0344 0.0135
(0.0522) (0.0843) (0.0472)
2SE -0.0826 0.136
(0.0519) (0.113)
Period -0.00675** 0.00534 0.00276
(0.00306) (0.00535) (0.00268)
1SEPeriod -0.0130**
(0.00649)
2SEPeriod -0.0209**
(0.00869)
2SE n=2 0.000693
(0.0578)
2SE n=3 0.0875*
(0.0530)
Observations 1,020 1,020 893
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.10: Marginal e¤ects from population-averaged probit regressions with the resale market
opening as dependent variable.
The coe¢ cient on 1SE in model 1 is negative and signicant and a coe¢ cient test shows
signicant di¤erences between the 1SE and 2SE treatments (p = 0:0471), demonstrating that
resale was less likely in the 1SE treatment. The negative and signicant coe¢ cient on vB
indicates that resale was less likely when the bidder had a higher value. There is also a signicant
negative time trend, which emerges in both entry treatments but is stronger in the 2SE treatment
(see model 2). In the last model, there is no major treatment e¤ects conditional on entry by a
speculator.
Empirical Result 4: Post-auction resale occurs less often when the bidder has a higher value
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and in markets with one speculator who has entry choice.
Table 4.11 analyzes the success of resale using probit regressions, where the dependent vari-
able is equal to 1 if all units won by a speculator are resold to the bidder. We include variables
which measure the di¤erence between the bidders value and the auction price, the di¤erence
between the speculators and the bidders last resale o¤ers, period of play, and the number of of-
fers made by players. Model 1 tests for treatment e¤ects, with the 1S treatment as the baseline,
while model 2 tests if the success of resale depends on the number of units won by speculators
and number of speculators in the resale market.
(1) (2)
Resale Success
vB Auction Price 0.00402*** 0.00362***
(0.000824) (0.000715)
Last o¤er di¤erence -0.00599*** -0.00547***
(0.00152) (0.00143)
Period 0.00582 0.00463*
(0.00361) (0.00279)
# S o¤ers -0.00801 -0.000190
(0.00743) (0.00891)
# B o¤ers -0.0171* -0.0225**
(0.00929) (0.00915)
1SE -0.0407
(0.0455)
2SE 0.0149
(0.0511)
B 1 Unit Wint 1 0.00349
(0.0262)
B 2 Units Wint 1 0.0147
(0.0306)
S win 1 0.0999**
(0.0490)
S win 2 0.0102
(0.0499)
Observations 519 566
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.11: Marginal e¤ects from population-averaged probit regressions with resale success as
dependent variable.
The positive and signicant e¤ect of the di¤erence between the bidders value and the auction
price suggests that, by bidding aggressively and increasing the auction price, speculators increase
their probability of winning but also reduce their success rates in resale. Model 1 shows no
treatment e¤ect (coe¢ cient tests, p = 0:192). Model 2 compares the baseline case where 2
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speculators win one unit each with the cases where only one speculator wins one unit and where
one speculator wins both units: the probability of successful resale is higher when there is only
one speculator who wins a single unit (coe¢ cient test, p = 0:008).
Empirical Result 5: Resale is more likely to succeed if a single speculator won only one unit.
The di¤erence between success rates for markets with one speculator and two speculators
is not surprising, since it is more di¢ cult for the bidder to bargain with more speculators. It
is somewhat surprising, however, that resale with a single speculator who won both units is
also less likely to succeed, since the bidder could obtain zero earnings in this case. Moreover,
speculators were allowed to bundle the units, which may make trading easier, or sell each unit
separately at possibly di¤erent prices. In most cases where the speculator won both units, they
chose to bundle the units (173 out of 246 resale markets), and failure was rarely the result of 1
unit selling without the other (8 out of 188 failure cases).
4.5. Prices, E¢ ciency, and Earnings
Table 4.12 presents pooled OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the session level.
(1) (2) (3)
Auction Price Auction E¢ ciency Final E¢ ciency
vB 0.179*** 0.00530*** 0.00497***
(0.0406) (0.000873) (0.00120)
1SE 0.321 0.00685 0.0137
(3.271) (0.0173) (0.0226)
2SE n=2 5.373 -0.0647* 0.0116
(3.664) (0.0326) (0.0285)
2SE n=3 21.28*** -0.198** -0.0869*
(3.298) (0.0647) (0.0391)
Period -0.668*** -0.00162* 0.00577*
(0.179) (0.000790) (0.00247)
Constant 30.06*** 0.0765 0.465***
(5.366) (0.0642) (0.105)
Observations 893 893 893
R-squared 0.161 0.097 0.093
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.12: Pooled OLS regressions on outcome variables.
Model 1 examines auction prices. The average auction price is above zero, as indicated by
the signicant constant, and is increasing in the bidders valuation. No signicant di¤erences are
found between treatments with two participants (p = 0:102), but prices are signicantly higher
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in the 2SE n=3 treatment (p < 0:001). The negative signicant coe¢ cient on Period indicates
that the auction price decreases over time.
Empirical Result 6: Auction prices are higher when two speculators enter the auction.
Models 2 and 3 examine auction and nal e¢ ciency. In all models, e¢ ciency is positively
correlated to the bidders value, indicating that bidders with higher values tend to obtain the
units more often in the auction and in the resale market. Model 2 shows that auction e¢ ciency
is lower in the 2SE treatment, especially when both speculators enter the auction. Treatment
di¤erences for nal e¢ ciency are reduced in model 3, indicating that resale corrects the lower
auction e¢ ciency observed in the 2SE treatment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Earnings S S S B B
vB 0.565*** 0.570*** 1.476***
(0.0904) (0.0906) (0.0844)
1SE -0.678 -1.105 9.314 2.645 1.461
(3.415) (3.477) (7.483) (4.133) (3.903)
2SE n=2 1.679 2.104 28.42** -12.16** -11.05**
(5.689) (5.787) (12.29) (5.644) (5.272)
2SE n=3 -14.13*** -15.44*** 1.155 -26.63*** -29.87***
(3.631) (3.625) (8.102) (4.392) (4.011)
Period 1.114*** 0.912*** 0.927*** 1.582*** 1.029***
(0.274) (0.268) (0.265) (0.316) (0.304)
Risk Measure (1-5) 0.712 1.092 5.076** -0.120 -0.644
(0.898) (0.939) (1.974) (1.069) (0.983)
1SERisk Measure -3.697
(2.362)
2SE n=2Risk Measure -9.017***
(3.128)
2SE n=3Risk Measure -5.628**
(2.300)
Constant -5.472 -46.29*** -57.96*** 37.01*** -64.79***
(4.812) (9.209) (10.93) (5.764) (6.767)
Observations 1,035 1,035 1,035 893 893
Number of Clusters 88 88 88 68 68
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.13: Random e¤ects regressions with playersearnings in a round as dependent variables.
Table 4.13 examines total earnings, including both auction and resale earnings, for specu-
lators (models 1-3) and the bidder (models 4 and 5), through random e¤ects panel regressions
with standard errors clustered at the individual level and the 1S treatment as the baseline.
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Observations are restricted to rounds where a speculator entered.22 In Model 1, speculators
earnings are lower when two speculators entered the auction. There are no other signicant
di¤erences between treatments (p = 0:643). In Model 2, the bidders value has a positive and
signicant e¤ect on speculatorsearnings.
Model 3 interacts speculatorsrisk preferences with treatments. The signicant coe¢ cient
on the risk measure shows that risk tolerant speculators earned more in markets with a single
speculator, while the coe¢ cients on the interactions of the risk measure with the 2SE treatment
shows that speculators earned less in markets with two speculators.
The last two models examine biddersearnings. Basic treatment e¤ects are tested in model
4 which shows that bidders are worse o¤ in markets with two speculators, especially when both
entered the auction (p = 0:005). The bidders value in model 5 has a positive and signicant
e¤ect on earnings, as expected. Across all models, earnings are increasing for both types over
time, which corresponds to falling auction prices in Table 4.12.
Empirical Result 7: Speculatorsand the bidders earnings are lowest when there are 2 spec-
ulators in the auction.
5. Conclusion
We use a combination of theory and controlled laboratory experiments to analyze the e¤ects of
speculators in multi-object auctions, where the number of speculators and the entry choice of the
speculator is varied. The environment is designed to measure the response of non-speculative
bidders to the presence of speculators, and speculators response to other speculators in the
market.
Regardless of the number of speculators, bidders consistently reduce demand by bidding less
aggressively on the second unit, allowing speculators to win at least one unit in the auction.
In most cases, speculators make positive prot by reselling, which induces other speculators to
enter the auction. In markets with multiple speculators, individual speculators enter less often,
as predicted, but coordination failure led most auctions to have multiple speculators which
almost always resulted in speculatorslosses.
Speculators are much more responsive than bidders to treatment conditions. In markets with
a single speculator, speculators did not always enter the auction and we nd little evidence that
this is due to risk preferences. In the treatment with multiple speculators, speculators with high
levels of risk tolerance were more likely to enter, even after periods in which they made losses
or both speculators entered. Since no e¤ects on bidding were observed, the higher revenue in
auctions with multiple speculators was only due to an increase in the number of participants.
Auction e¢ ciency is often lower than in a random allocation. Resale may correct an ine¢ cient
auction allocation, but it never fully restores e¢ ciency in our environment. The main reason for
22Specically, we only include speculators who participated in the auction and bidders who did not win by
default.
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resale failure is an auction price too close to the bidders value, which was most likely to occur
when the bidder did not win any unit.
In sum, our results suggest that in multi-object auctions bidders will generally reduce demand
whenever speculators are present. Therefore, a seller who aims to increase his revenue should
attract multiple speculators, who are not likely to coordinate, by reducing their participation
costs. However, more speculators also reduce the e¢ ciency of the resale market and of the nal
allocation, suggesting a revenue/e¢ ciency trade-o¤.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First notice that the rst-unit bid (i.e., the highest bid by a player)
does not a¤ect the auction price, and that increasing the second-unit bid without changing the
auction allocation only increases the auction price and reduces players prot. Therefore, a
player may only have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium described if this allows him
to win two units  i.e., the speculator may only have an incentive to deviate by bidding more
than vB for both units and the bidder may only have an incentive to deviate by bidding more
than 50 for both units.
If the speculator bids any price higher than vB for both units, he wins two units at per-unit
price vB but, because he cannot resell them at a price higher than the bidders valuation, he
obtains at most zero prot. If the bidder bids any price higher than 50 for both units, he wins
two units at per-unit price 50 but obtains a prot that is lower than the equilibrium ones because
2vB   r > 2 (vB   50) , r < 100;
which is always true since the resale price cannot be higher than the highest possible bidders
valuation. Hence, neither the bidder nor the speculator have any incentive to deviate from the
equilibrium described. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that no player has an incentive to deviate from the strategies
described. First, consider the speculator who bids 100 for both units and wins both units at
price E [r] in the auction. By changing his strategy, he could only reduce the number of units
he wins in the auction, without a¤ecting the auction price.
Second, consider the speculator who bids E [r] for both units and wins no unit in the auction.
In order to win a unit, he has to outbid the other speculator and raise the auction price up to
100. This would result in negative prot since he cannot resell a unit at a price that is higher
than the highest possible bidders valuation. Third, consider the bidder who wins no unit in the
auction and acquires them in the resale market at price r. In order to win a unit in the auction,
he has to outbid the speculators and raise the auction price up to 100. Since this is higher than
r, by winning two units the bidder reduces his prot. 
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A.2. Additional Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
B Bid 1S 1SE 2SE n=2 2SE n=3 2SE n=3
bid 1 bid 1 bid 1 bid 1 bid 2
vB 0.509*** 0.570*** 0.660*** 0.485*** 0.408**
(0.103) (0.0870) (0.104) (0.139) (0.180)
Constant 19.54*** 14.53** 8.187 23.82** 3.931
(6.802) (7.375) (7.064) (10.04) (12.17)
Observations 300 332 119 142 142
Number of Clusters 20 28 20 20 20
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.1: Random e¤ects regressions with bidders bid for either unit 1 (the highest bid) or
unit 2 as dependent variable.
29
A.3. 1S Instructions
Thank you for participating in todays experiment. I will read through a script to explain to
you the nature of todays experiment as well as how to work the computer interface you will
be using. I will be using this script to make sure that all sessions of this experiment receive
the same information, but please feel free to ask questions as they arise. We ask that everyone
please refrain from talking or looking at the monitors of other subjects during the experiment.
The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular situa-
tion. You will receive 10 dollars for showing up for the experiment. You will also make additional
money during todays experiment. Payments will be in cash at the end of the experiment and
are condential.
You can now follow along with the instructions on your screen. In the rst stage of this
experiment, we will ask you to play a lottery of your choice. Please press continue to enter in
to this game.
What you should see is a series of 5 lotteries labeled A through E. On the right there is
a virtual coin, which has two sides, heads and tails, and will be used to determine the payo¤
outcome. Please choose one of the lotteries you would like to play and then Flip the coin.
Depending on which side the coin lands on, you will earn the amount corresponding to the heads
or tails column. Both heads and tails are equally likely. Once you have conrmed your choice,
the game will play out and your resulting payo¤ will be shown at the bottom of the screen.
Please make your decision now, and hit continue once you have nished.
Stage 2: In this next stage, you will be a bidder in a series of auctions. You may have some
experience bidding in auctions or you may have seen various types of auctions on television.
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Please do not assume this auction is like those and please pay particular attention to the rules
of this auction as it is in your nancial interest to do so. All amounts in this phase of the
experiment are in experimental currency units, ECUs. At the end of the experiment, each ECU
you earn will convert into dollars at a rate of 1 ECU = $0.01.
Basics: To make these instructions as simple as possible, we will rst discuss the basic details
and then we will add in other elements.
Rounds: You will participate in a series of rounds. Each round will consist of you partici-
pating in an auction, which may then be followed by a post-auction resale market.
Player Types: You have been assigned a player type: blue or green player. You will maintain
this type throughout the experiment.
Groups: In each round, you will be randomly matched into a group consisting of 1 green
player and 1 blue player. The two players in the group will be bidding against each other.
Auction: Each auction has 2 hypothetical items for sale, which we call units. Both units
will be auctioned o¤ together. Green players will be given a unit value in each round that is
drawn randomly from the numbers between 50 and 100, with each number equally likely. What
this value represents is the amount paid to green players if they win a unit in the auction. Blue
players will have no unit value.
Resale Market: After the auction, if a blue player wins a unit in the auction, they will have
the opportunity to resell any units won to the green player.
Auction and Resale Payo¤s: Green players make money by buying units in the auction or
in resale. Blue players make money by selling units won in the auction to green players.
In the auction you can make two bids - one bid for each unit on sale. To place bids, type the
bid amounts in the blue boxes located in the middle of the screen and press the Submit Bids
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button. If your bids are higher than the bids submitted by the other player from your group,
you will win both units. If you place one of the two highest bids in your group, you will win one
unit. If you do not place the two highest bids, you will not win any units.
The auction price that winners must pay for each unit is set by the third highest bid and is
the same for both units.
Please turn now to the auction example in the handout you were given to see how this works
Bid 1 Bid 2
Blue Player 55 60
Green Player (value 75) 70 0
In this example both the blue player and green player place two bids, as seen in the rst
table, for a total of 4 bids. Please note that these bids are for example purposes only and are
not suggestive of how you should make decisions. The computer will rank all bids made from
highest to lowest, and assign outcomes. It doesnt matter which order the bids were submitted
and any ties in bids will be broken randomly by the computer. You can see how this works in
the second table. All bids have been ranked from highest to lowest.
Rank Bid Player who made bid Result
1 70 Green Highest bid win unit 1
2 60 Blue 2nd highest bid win unit 2
3 55 Blue 3rd highest bid sets the auction price (55) for units 1 & 2
4 0 Green
The green player made the highest bid of 70, and so wins 1 unit. The blue player placed the
second highest bid of 60, and wins the second unit. The auction price is set by the third highest
bid, which in this example is 55. The price is the same for both units, so in this example, the
green player and the blue player will each pay a price of 55 for the unit they won.
Auction payo¤s can be seen in the third table. The only type of player who can make
money during the auction is the green player. If the green player wins a unit, they will earn the
di¤erence between their unit value and the auction price. Blue players will pay the price for any
unit won, but cannot make money in the auction because they do not have a value.
Player Units Won Auction Price Auction Payo¤s
Green 1 55 Value Price Paid = 75-55 = 20 ECUs
Blue 1 55 Price Paid 55
Assuming the green players value is 75 and that the price resulting from the auction is 55,
the green player who won a unit would earn 20 ECUs in the auction. The blue player will pay
a price of 55, and if they fail to resell the unit, the must still pay the auction price resulting in
a loss of -55 for the round.
Since it is possible to lose money, you will all begin this phase of the experiment with a
balance of ECUs: 400 for blue players and 50 for green players. This balance will increase
as you make prots and decrease when you make losses. Should you lose enough money that
this balance becomes negative; you will be reset with your initial balance once, and continue
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participating. If you go bankrupt a second time, you will be removed from the experiment and
paid your show-up fee only.
During the auction, you will have a reminder of the payo¤ rules which you can see on the
left side of the auction screen. A few nal details before we continue: All bids must be between
0 and 100, which is the maximum possible value of the green player. At the top of the auction
screen, you will nd reminder information about how many bidders are in the auction which
is 2. Any ties in bids will be broken randomly by the computer.
We will now work through a new example using the computer where you input bids. Please
input two bids, both equal to 40, into the blue boxes and press Submit Bids. Please note that
bids do not have to be equal, this is only for example purposes. When the auction ends, you
will be redirected to a results screen similar to the one that you see now. The blue and green
player tied for the two highest bids and so the computer randomly split the units between these
two players. The blue player won 1 unit and the green player won 1 unit. They both paid the
auction price of 40 for their unit.
Because the blue player won a unit, there will be a resale market where the blue player can
resell the unit won to the green player. The green player earned the di¤erence between their
value, 75, and the auction price, 40, for auction earnings of 35 for the unit won. Please press
continue to enter the resale market
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The green players value will be identical to the value held during the auction stage. If you
are a green player, you will see a reminder of this at the top of the market.
For resale to occur, both the blue player and the green player must agree to a resale o¤er. If
they agree to a resale o¤er, the unit will be traded and the green player will earn the di¤erence
between their value and the resale price. The blue player will earn the di¤erence between the
resale price and the price they paid in the auction. If no resale o¤er is agreed to, no units will
be traded.
Resale o¤ers are made in the blue box at the top of the screen. Directly above this box, you
will see a reminder of the units for sale in this market, which in this case is 1 unit.
You have two tools to facilitate your resale decisions. The rst is chat. Messages can be sent
to the other participant in this box. Please type a message now in the long blue space below
the large box where the chat is displayed, for example, helloand press enter. Make sure that
you hit enter after you have typed a message for it to be sent. Check that everyone was able
to send a message. We also ask that throughout the experiment you do not provide identiable
information about yourself to the other participants.
In addition to chat, you will also have access to the scrollbar seen at the bottom of the
screen. You can use the scrollbar to determine your payo¤ for a given o¤er. This will always
be your per unit prot, even if you are selling 2 units. Please move the scrollbar now. You will
see your prot for a given o¤er. You are also given information about the others payo¤ below
your prot. For green players, it will be Blues prot and for Blue players, you will be told the
probability that a given o¤er would lead to positive prots for the green player.
If you would like to exit resale at any time before agreement, there will be an exit button
at the bottom of the market which you can click. (Emphasize) You will have 180 seconds (or
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3 minutes) to agree to an o¤er with the other participant. The time will be indicated at the
top of the screen Currently it is paused at 180 seconds for example purposes, but during the
experiment this clock will actively click down.
The resale market will end automatically when time expires, or when one of the participants
chooses to exit, or when an o¤er is agreed to. Once resale ends, you will be automatically
redirected to the next screen. Lets now practice making an o¤er. Everyone please input an
o¤er of 60 into the blue box. Of course, if this were the actual experiment, you do not both
have to type in the same o¤er, and this is only for example purposes. Once you have typed in
the o¤er, you will see the box underneath update with your o¤er if you have done this correctly.
You should also see the other players o¤er update.
To accept the o¤er of the other participant, click on their o¤er, which will highlight in Blue
and then click Accept.Once all units have been agreed to, the resale stage will immediately
terminate. Prior to agreement, o¤ers can be changed at any time. Please accept the o¤er
available to you to continue.
What you will now see is the typical screen at the end of the round that displays all results.
At the top will be a recap of the auction. Green players won 1 unit and earned 35 for that unit
in the auction. The blue player won the other unit and paid a price of 40. Below this will be the
resale results. In resale, Green purchased 1 unit from the blue player, for a resale price of 60.
Green earns the di¤erence between their value in this practice round, 75, and the resale price,
60, for the unit purchased. Total earnings for green in resale are 15. Greens total earnings for
the round are equal to the auction earnings plus resale earnings, 50. Blue earned the resale price
of 60, less the price paid in the auction, 40, for total earnings of 20.
Please press continue. We will go through one more example that will demonstrate other
scenarios you may encounter.
If you are a green bidder, please place two 0 bids. Blue players can also bid 0, but for this
example, if you are a blue player please place two bids of 30. Please submit your bids.You will
now see that you have been directed to a tic-tac-toe board rather than the auction results.
Because of group matching design we use, it may be the case that some groups are waiting
on others to nish making decisions. During this downtime, all members of your group will be
directed to a tic-tac-toe board similar to this to wait until the round can continue. There are
no earnings for tic-tac-toe.
Please press continue.
You will see the summary screen of the auction here. The blue player placed the two highest
bids and won both units at a price of 0, which was the third highest bid of the group. The last
line of this screen for both players will indicate the number of units available for trade which
in this example will be 2. Please press continue to enter into the resale market for this example.
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The screen for resale is now slightly di¤erent from the last example. Notice that in addition
to the o¤er price, you must now also input the number of units to trade: 1 or 2. Below the
units input, you will again be asked to submit an o¤er. The o¤er will always be per unit, but
both units can be traded together. For example, please now input 2 and an o¤er of 70, then
click MAKE OFFER. If this o¤er was accepted by the other participant, the total resale price
would be 140. It is also possible to sell one unit at a time by inputting 1 unit instead of 2.
In all resale stages, you will have the option to exit before a trade is made. Please press the
EXIT RESALE button to leave the resale market.
You can now see the standard results screen for this example notice there are no resale
earnings, because no units were traded in resale. Please press continue.
We are about to begin the actual auctions that you will be paid for. Are there any questions
? You will now begin the paid rounds. You are participating at your own pace. Please follow
the on screen instructions. Please also make sure that when a continue button is available, you
click it whenever you are ready so the experiment can continue.
A.4. 1SE Instructions
Thank you for participating in todays experiment. I will read through a script to explain to
you the nature of todays experiment as well as how to work the computer interface you will
be using. I will be using this script to make sure that all sessions of this experiment receive
the same information, but please feel free to ask questions as they arise. We ask that everyone
please refrain from talking or looking at the monitors of other subjects during the experiment.
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The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular situa-
tion. You will receive 10 dollars for showing up for the experiment. You will also make additional
money during todays experiment. Payments will be in cash at the end of the experiment and
are condential. You can now follow along with the instructions on your screen.
In the rst stage of this experiment, we will ask you to play a lottery of your choice. Please
press continue to enter in to this game.
(see lottery screenshot in 1S instructions)
What you should see is a series of 5 lotteries labeled A through E. On the right there is
a virtual coin, which has two sides, heads and tails, and will be used to determine the payo¤
outcome. Please choose one of the lotteries you would like to play and then Flip the coin.
Depending on which side the coin lands on, you will earn the amount corresponding to the heads
or tails column. Both heads and tails are equally likely. Once you have conrmed your choice,
the game will play out and your resulting payo¤ will be shown at the bottom of the screen.
Please make your decision now, and hit continue once you have nished.
Stage 2: In this next stage, you will be a bidder in a series of auctions. You may have some
experience bidding in auctions or you may have seen various types of auctions on television.
Please do not assume this auction is like those and please pay particular attention to the rules
of this auction as it is in your nancial interest to do so. All amounts in this phase of the
experiment are in experimental currency units, ECUs. At the end of the experiment, each ECU
you earn will convert into dollars at a rate of 1 ECU = $0.01.
Please hit continue
Basics: To make these instructions as simple as possible, we will rst discuss the basic details
and then we will add in other elements.
Rounds: You will participate in a series of rounds. Each round will consist of some of you
making a choice to enter into an auction, which may then be followed by a post-auction resale
market.
Player Types: You have been assigned a player type: blue or green player. You will maintain
this type throughout the experiment.
Entry & Groups: In each round, you will be randomly matched into a group consisting of
1 green player and 1 blue player. The blue player in your group will choose whether or not to
enter into the auction with the green player who was automatically entered, and all entrants
into the auction will be bidding against each other.
Auction: Each auction has 2 hypothetical items for sale, which we call units. Both units
will be auctioned o¤ together. Green players will be given a unit value in each round that is
drawn randomly from the numbers between 50 and 100, with each number equally likely. What
this value represents is the amount paid to green players if they win a unit in the auction. Blue
players will have no unit value.
Resale Market: After the auction, if a blue player wins a unit in the auction, they will have
the opportunity to resell any units won to the green player.
Auction and Resale Payo¤s: Green players make money by buying units in the auction or
in resale. Blue players make money by selling units won in the auction to green players.
Please press continue as we will now go through a series of examples to explain the details
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At the start of each round, the blue player will be asked if they want to enter into the auction.
Depending on your type, blue or green, this is a sample of the screen you will see. If you are
a blue player and you enter the auction, your earnings will be determined in the auction and
resale markets. If however, you choose not to enter the auction, you will earn 10 ECUs for the
round. This will be the nal payment for the round if you are a blue player. If you are a green
player you are automatically entered into the auction in each round.
For the auction to begin, the blue player must choose to enter. If the blue player does not
enter into the auction, the units will be awarded by default to the green player at a price of zero
(with no auction taking place since there is only 1 bidder).
If you are a blue player, Please hit ENTER AUCTIONto learn how the auction works.
If you are a green player please hit Continueduring the paid rounds you will not have this
button, but will be automatically directed forward once the decision by the blue player in your
group has been made.
(see auction screenshot in 1S instructions)
In the auction you can make two bids - one bid for each unit on sale. To place bids, type
the bid amounts in the blue boxes located in the middle of the screen and press the Submit
Bids button. If your bids are higher than the bids submitted by the other player from your
group, you will win both units. If you place one of the two highest bids in your group, you will
win one unit. If you do not place the two highest bids, you will not win any units. The auction
price that winners must pay for each unit is set by the third highest bid and is the same for
both units.
In this example, assume there are two bidders in the auction because the blue player entered.
Each bidder places two bids, as seen in the rst table, for a total of 4 bids. Please note that these
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bids are for example purposes only and are not suggestive of how you should make decisions.
Please turn now to the auction example in the handout you were given to see how this works
Bid 1 Bid 2
Blue Player 55 60
Green Player (value 75) 70 0
In this example both the blue player and green player place two bids, as seen in the rst
table, for a total of 4 bids. Please note that these bids are for example purposes only and are
not suggestive of how you should make decisions. The computer will rank all bids made from
highest to lowest, and assign outcomes. It doesnt matter which order the bids were submitted
and any ties in bids will be broken randomly by the computer. You can see how this works in
the second table. All bids have been ranked from highest to lowest.
Rank Bid Player who made bid Result
1 70 Green Highest bid win unit 1
2 60 Blue 2nd highest bid win unit 2
3 55 Blue 3rd highest bid sets the auction price (55) for units 1 & 2
4 0 Green
The green player made the highest bid of 70, and so wins 1 unit. The blue player placed the
second highest bid of 60, and wins the second unit. The auction price is set by the third highest
bid, which in this example is 55. The price is the same for both units, so in this example, the
green player and the blue player will each pay a price of 55 for the unit they won.
Auction payo¤s can be seen in the third table. The only type of player who can make
money during the auction is the green player. If the green player wins a unit, they will earn the
di¤erence between their unit value and the auction price. Blue players will pay the price for any
unit won, but cannot make money in the auction because they do not have a value.
Player Units Won Auction Price Auction Payo¤s
Green 1 55 Value Price Paid = 75-55 = 20 ECUs
Blue 1 55 Price Paid 55
Assuming the green players value is 75 and that the price resulting from the auction is 55,
the green player who won a unit would earn 20 ECUs in the auction. The blue player will pay
a price of 55, and if they fail to resell the unit, the must still pay the auction price resulting in
a loss of -55 for the round.
Since it is possible to lose money, you will all begin this phase of the experiment with a
balance of ECUs: 400 for blue players and 50 for green players. This balance will increase
as you make prots and decrease when you make losses. Should you lose enough money that
this balance becomes negative; you will be reset with your initial balance once, and continue
participating. If you go bankrupt a second time, you will be removed from the experiment and
paid your show-up fee only.
Please now turn again to the auction screen on your computer. During the auction, you will
have a reminder of the payo¤ rules which you can see on the left side of the auction screen.
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A few nal details before we continue: All bids must be between 0 and 100, which is the
maximum possible value of the green player. At the top of the auction screen, you will nd
reminder information about how many bidders are in the auction which is 2. Any ties in bids
will be broken randomly by the computer.
We will now work through a new example using the computer where you input bids. Please
input two bids, both equal to 40, into the blue boxes and press Submit Bids. Please note that
bids do not have to be equal, this is only for example purposes. When the auction ends, you
will be redirected to a results screen similar to the one that you see now. The blue and green
player tied for the two highest bids and so the computer randomly split the units between these
two players. The blue player won 1 unit and the green player won 1 unit. They both paid the
auction price of 40 for their unit.
Because the blue player won a unit, there will be a resale market where the blue player can
resell the unit won to the green player. The green player earned the di¤erence between their
value, 75, and the auction price, 40, for auction earnings of 35 for the unit won.
Please press continue to enter the resale market
(see resale screenshots in 1S instructions)
The green players value will be identical to the value held during the auction stage. If you
are a green player, you will see a reminder of this at the top of the market.
For resale to occur, both the blue player and the green player must agree to a resale o¤er. If
they agree to a resale o¤er, the unit will be traded and the green player will earn the di¤erence
between their value and the resale price. The blue player will earn the di¤erence between the
resale price and the price they paid in the auction. If no resale o¤er is agreed to, no units will
be traded.
Resale o¤ers are made in the blue box at the top of the screen. Directly above this box, you
will see a reminder of the units for sale in this market, which in this case is 1 unit.
You have two tools to facilitate your resale decisions. The rst is chat. Messages can be sent
to the other participant in this box. Please type a message now in the long blue space below
the large box where the chat is displayed, for example, helloand press enter. Make sure that
you hit enter after you have typed a message for it to be sent. Check that everyone was able
to send a message. We also ask that throughout the experiment you do not provide identiable
information about yourself to the other participants.
In addition to chat, you will also have access to the scrollbar seen at the bottom of the
screen. You can use the scrollbar to determine your payo¤ for a given o¤er. This will always
be your per unit prot, even if you are selling 2 units. Please move the scrollbar now. You will
see your prot for a given o¤er. You are also given information about the others payo¤ below
your prot. For green players, it will be Blues prot and for Blue players, you will be told the
probability that a given o¤er would lead to positive prots for the green player.
If you would like to exit resale at any time before agreement, there will be an exit button
at the bottom of the market which you can click. (Emphasize) You will have 180 seconds (or
3 minutes) to agree to an o¤er with the other participant. The time will be indicated at the
top of the screen Currently it is paused at 180 seconds for example purposes, but during the
experiment this clock will actively click down.
The resale market will end automatically when time expires, or when one of the participants
chooses to exit, or when an o¤er is agreed to. Once resale ends, you will be automatically
redirected to the next screen.
Lets now practice making an o¤er. Everyone please input an o¤er of 60 into the blue box.
Of course, if this were the actual experiment, you do not both have to type in the same o¤er,
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and this is only for example purposes. Once you have typed in the o¤er, you will see the box
underneath update with your o¤er if you have done this correctly. You should also see the other
players o¤er update.
To accept the o¤er of the other participant, click on their o¤er, which will highlight in Blue
and then click Accept.Once all units have been agreed to, the resale stage will immediately
terminate. Prior to agreement, o¤ers can be changed at anytime.
Please accept the o¤er available to you to continue.
What you will now see is the typical screen at the end of the round that displays all results.
At the top will be a recap of the auction. Green players won 1 unit and earned 35 for that unit
in the auction. The blue player won the other unit and paid a price of 40. Below this will be the
resale results. In resale, Green purchased 1 unit from the blue player, for a resale price of 60.
Green earns the di¤erence between their value in this practice round, 75, and the resale price,
60, for the unit purchased. Total earnings for green in resale are 15. Greens total earnings for
the round are equal to the auction earnings plus resale earnings, 50. Blue earned the resale price
of 60, less the price paid in the auction, 40, for total earnings of 20.
Please press continue. We will go through one more example that will demonstrate other
scenarios you may encounter.
You should see the same entry screen that starts a round. If you are a blue player, please
now choose ENTER AUCTION. If you are a green player, press continue.
If you are a green bidder, please place two 0 bids. Even though you do not have choice about
whether or not to enter the auction, you can still choose to bid 0 on each item. Blue players
can also bid 0, but for this example, if you are a blue player please place two bids of 30. Please
submit your bids.
You will now see that you have been directed to a tic-tac-toe board rather than the auction
results.
Because of group matching design we use, it may be the case that some groups are waiting
on others to nish making decisions. During this downtime, all members of your group will be
directed to a tic-tac-toe board similar to this to wait until the round can continue. There are
no earnings for tic-tac-toe. Please press continue
You will see the summary screen of the auction here. The blue player placed the two highest
bids and won both units at a price of 0, which was the third highest bid of the group. The last
line of this screen for both players will indicate the number of units available for trade which
in this example will be 2.
Please press continue to enter into the resale market for this example.
(see resale screenshot in 1S instructions)
The screen for resale is now slightly di¤erent from the last example. Notice that in addition
to the o¤er price, you must now also input the number of units to trade: 1 or 2. Below the
units input, you will again be asked to submit an o¤er. The o¤er will always be per unit, but
both units can be traded together. For example, please now input 2 and an o¤er of 70, then
click MAKE OFFER. If this o¤er was accepted by the other participant, the total resale price
would be 140. It is also possible to sell one unit at a time by inputting 1 unit instead of 2.
In all resale stages, you will have the option to exit before a trade is made. Please press the
EXIT RESALE button to leave the resale market.
You can now see the standard results screen for this example notice there are no resale
earnings, because no units were traded in resale. Please press continue.
We are about to begin the actual auctions that you will be paid for. Are there any questions?
You will now begin the paid rounds. You are participating at your own pace. Please follow the
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on screen instructions. Please also make sure that when a continue button is available, you click
it whenever you are ready so the experiment can continue.
A.5. 2SE Instructions
The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation.
You will receive 10 dollars for showing up for the experiment. You will also make additional
money during todays experiment. Payments will be in cash at the end of the experiment and
are condential.
You can now follow along with the instructions on your screen.
In the rst stage of this experiment, we will ask you to play a lottery of your choice. Please
press continue to enter in to this game.
After they have clicked through and landed on lottery screen
(see lottery screenshot in 1S instructions)
What you should see is a series of 5 lotteries labeled A through E. On the right there is
a virtual coin, which has two sides, heads and tails, and will be used to determine the payo¤
outcome. Please choose one of the lotteries you would like to play and then Flip the coin.
Depending on which side the coin lands on, you will earn the amount corresponding to the heads
or tails column. Both heads and tails are equally likely. Once you have conrmed your choice,
the game will play out and your resulting payo¤ will be shown at the bottom of the screen.
Please make your decision now, and hit continue once you have nished.
Stage 2: In this next stage, you will be a bidder in a series of auctions. You may have some
experience bidding in auctions or you may have seen various types of auctions on television.
Please do not assume this auction is like those and please pay particular attention to the rules
of this auction as it is in your nancial interest to do so. All amounts in this phase of the
experiment are in experimental currency units, ECUs. At the end of the experiment, each ECU
you earn will convert into dollars at a rate of 1 ECU = $0.01.
Please hit continue
Basics: To make these instructions as simple as possible, we will rst discuss the basic details
and then we will add in other elements.
Rounds: You will participate in a series of rounds. Each round will consist of some of you
making a choice to enter into an auction, which may then be followed by a post-auction resale
market.
Player Types: You have been assigned a player type: blue or green player. You will maintain
this type throughout the experiment.
Entry & Groups: In each round, you will be randomly matched into a group consisting of
1 green player and 2 blue players. Both blue players in the group will choose whether or not
to enter into the auction with the green player who was automatically entered, and all entrants
into the auction will be bidding against each other.
Auction: Each auction has 2 hypothetical items for sale, which we call units. Both units
will be auctioned o¤ together. Green players will be given a unit value in each round that is
drawn randomly from the numbers between 50 and 100, with each number equally likely. What
this value represents is the amount paid to green players if they win a unit in the auction. Blue
players will have no unit value.
Resale Market: After the auction, if a blue player wins a unit in the auction, they will have
the opportunity to resell any units won to the green player.
Auction and Resale Payo¤s: Green players make money by buying units in the auction or
in resale. Blue players make money by selling units won in the auction to green players.
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Please press continue as we will now go through a series of examples to explain the details
(see entry screenshot 1SE instructions)
At the start of each round, the blue players will be asked if they want to enter into the
auction. Depending on your type, blue or green, this is a sample of the screen you will see. If
you are a blue player and you enter the auction, your earnings will be determined in the auction
and resale markets. If however, you choose not to enter the auction, you will earn 10 ECUs for
the round. This will be the nal payment for the round if you are a blue player. If you are a
green player you are automatically entered into the auction in each round.
For the auction to begin, at least one blue player from the group must choose to enter. If no
blue player enters into the auction, the units will be awarded by default to the green player at
a price of zero (with no auction taking place since there is only 1 bidder).
If you are a blue player, Please hit ENTER AUCTIONto learn how the auction works.
If you are a green player please hit Continueduring the paid rounds you will not have this
button, but will be automatically directed forward once all decisions by blue players in your
group have been made.
(see auction screenshot in 1S treatment)
In the auction you can make two bids - one bid for each unit on sale. To place bids, type
the bid amounts in the blue boxes located in the middle of the screen and press the Submit
Bidsbutton. If your bids are higher than all other bids submitted by players from your group
who are also participating in the auction, you will win both units. If you place one of the two
highest bids in your group, you will win one unit. If you do not place the two highest bids, you
will not win any units.
The auction price that winners must pay for each unit is set by the third highest bid and is
the same for both units.
Please turn now to the auction example in the handout you were given to see how this works
In this example, assume there are three bidders in the auction because both blue players
entered. Each bidder places two bids, as seen in the rst table, for a total of 6 bids. Please note
that these bids are for example purposes only and are not suggestive of how you should make
decisions.
Bid 1 Bid 2
Blue Player 1 55 50
Blue Player 2 50 60
Green Player (value 75) 70 0
The computer will rank all bids made from highest to lowest, and assign outcomes. It doesnt
matter which order the bids were submitted and any ties in bids will be broken randomly by the
computer. You can see how this works in theond table. All bids have been ranked from highest
to lowest.
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Rank Bid Player who made bid Result
1 70 Green Highest bid win unit 1
2 60 Blue 2 2nd highest bid win unit 2
3 55 Blue 1 3rd highest bid sets the auction price (55) for units 1 & 2
4 50 Blue 2
5 50 Blue 1
6 0 Green
The green player made the highest bid of 70, and so wins 1 unit. Blue Player 2 placed the
second highest bid of 60, and wins the second unit. Blue Player 1 does not win a unit because
he did not place either of the two highest bids.
The auction price is set by the third highest bid, which in this example is 55. The price is
the same for both units, so in this example, the green player and blue player 2 will each pay
a price of 55 for the unit they won. Auction payo¤s can be seen in the third table. The only
type of player who can make money during the auction is the green player. If the green player
wins a unit, they will earn the di¤erence between their unit value and the price resulting from
the auction. Blue players will pay the price for any unit won, but cannot make money in the
auction because they do not have a value.
Player Units Won Auction Price Auction Payo¤s
Green 1 55 Value Price Paid = 75-55 = 20 ECUs
Blue 2 1 55 Price Paid 55
Assuming the green players value is 75 and that the price resulting from the auction is 55,
the green player who won a unit would earn 20 ECUs in the auction. The blue player will pay
a price of 55, and if they fail to resell the unit, the must still pay the auction price resulting in
a loss of -55 for the round.
Since it is possible to lose money, you will all begin this phase of the experiment with a
balance of ECUs: 400 for blue players and 50 for green players. This balance will increase
as you make prots and decrease when you make losses. Should you lose enough money that
this balance becomes negative; you will be reset with your initial balance once, and continue
participating. If you go bankrupt a second time, you will be removed from the experiment and
paid your show-up fee only.
Please now turn again to the auction screen on your computer.
During the auction, you will have a reminder of the payo¤ rules which you can see on the
left side of the auction screen.
A few nal details before we continue: All bids must be between 0 and 100, which is the
maximum possible value of the green player. At the top of the auction screen, you will nd
information about how many players entered into the auction. In this example, there are three
bidders in the auction.
If 1 blue player had chosen to enter, rather than both blue players, then there will be a total
of 4 bids placed. In both cases, the bidding rules and pricing rules stay the same: The two
highest bids will each win a unit and the auction price will be equal to the third highest bid.
We will now work through a new example using the computer where you input bids.
If you are a green player, please input two bids, both equal to 40. If you are a blue player,
please input two bids equal to 50 into the blue boxes and press Submit Bids. Please note that
bids do not have to be equal, this is only for example purposes.
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When the auction ends, you will be redirected to a results screen similar to the one that you
see now. The two blue players tied for the two highest bids and so the computer randomly split
the units between these two players. Each blue player won 1 unit and paid the auction price of
40 for their unit.
The green player won zero units, because neither of their bids were one of the two highest.
Because the blue players won a unit, there will be a resale market where the blue player can
resell the unit won to the green player. In the resale market, the green player can purchase up
to two units, one from each blue player.
Please press continue to enter the resale market
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The green players value will be identical to the value held during the auction stage. If you
are a green player, you will see a reminder of this at the top of each market. In this example,
there are two markets open for green players one on the left, which is the market with blue
player 1 and one on the right, which is the market with blue player 2. You can buy 1 unit from
each blue player. In each market, you are only interacting with that specic blue player, and the
other blue player will not be aware of these exchanges. Blue players will only have one market
open as they only interact with the green player.
For resale to occur, both the blue player and the green player must agree to a resale o¤er. If
they agree to a resale o¤er, the unit will be traded and the green player will earn the di¤erence
between their value and the resale price. The blue player will earn the di¤erence between the
resale price and the price they paid in the auction. If no resale o¤er is agreed to, no units will
be traded.
Resale o¤ers are made in the blue box (or boxes if you are a green player) at the top of the
screen. Directly above this box, you will see a reminder of the units for sale in each market,
which in this case is 1 unit.
You have two tools to facilitate your resale decisions. The rst is chat. Messages can be sent
to the other participant in this box. Please type a message now in the long blue space below
the large box where the chat is displayed, for example, helloand press enter. Make sure that
you hit enter after you have typed a message for it to be sent. Check that everyone was able
to send a message. If you are a green player, please input a message in each box to each of the
blue players you are in the market with. Any message sent to Blue 1 will not be sent to Blue
2 and vice versa. We also ask that throughout the experiment you do not provide identiable
information about yourself to the other participants.
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In addition to chat, you will also have access to the scrollbar seen at the bottom of the
screen. You can use the scrollbar to determine your payo¤ for a given o¤er. This will always
be your per unit prot, even if you are selling 2 units. Please move the scrollbar now. You will
see your prot for a given o¤er. You are also given information about the others payo¤ below
your prot. For green players, it will be Blues prot and for Blue players, you will be told the
probability that a given o¤er would lead to positive prots for the green player.
If you would like to exit resale at any time before agreement, there will be an exit button
at the bottom of the market which you can click. (Emphasize) You will have 180 seconds (or
3 minutes) to agree to an o¤er with the other participants. The time will be indicated at the
top of the screen Currently it is paused at 180 seconds for example purposes, but during the
experiment this clock will actively click down.
The resale market will end automatically when time expires, or when one of the participants
chooses to exit, or when an o¤er is agreed to. Once resale ends, you will be automatically redi-
rected to the next screen. If two markets are open for the green player, you will be automatically
redirected when both markets close.
Lets now practice making an o¤er. Everyone please input an o¤er of 60 into the blue box.
If you are a green player, please make this o¤er to both blue players. Of course, if this were the
actual experiment, you do not both have to type in the same o¤er, and this is only for example
purposes. Once you have typed in the o¤er, you will see the box underneath update with your
o¤er if you have done this correctly. You should also see the other players o¤er update.
To accept the o¤er of the other participant, click on their o¤er, which will highlight in Blue
and then click Accept.Once all units have been agreed to, the resale stage will immediately
terminate. Prior to agreement, o¤ers can be changed at anytime.
Please accept the o¤er available to you to continue. If you are a green player, please accept
both o¤ers to continue.
What you will now see is the typical screen at the end of the round that displays all results.
At the top will be a recap of the auction. Green players didnt win a unit and so earned 0. Blue
players each won 1 unit and paid a price of 40. Below this will be the resale results. In resale,
Green purchased 2 units from each of the Blue players, for a resale price of 60. Green earns the
di¤erence between their value in this practice round, 75, and the resale price, 60, for each unit
purchased. Greens total earnings are therefore 30 (or 15 for each unit). Blue earned the resale
price of 60, less the price paid in the auction, 40, for total earnings of 20.
Please press continue. We will go through one more example that will demonstrate other
scenarios you may encounter.
You should see the same entry screen that starts a round. If you are a blue player, please
now choose ENTER AUCTION. If you are a green player, press continue.
Assume in this example that only 1 blue player in the group entered into the auction. The
other blue player in the group opted for NO ENTRY. You can see at the top of the auction
screen that there are only 2 bidders in the auction.
If you are a green bidder, please place two 0 bids. Even though you do not have choice about
whether or not to enter the auction, you can still choose to bid 0 on each item. Blue players
can also bid 0, but for this example, if you are a blue player please place two bids of 30. Please
submit your bids.
You will now see that you have been directed to a tic-tac-toe board rather than the auction
results.
Because of group matching design we use, it may be the case that some groups are waiting
on others to nish making decisions. During this downtime, all members of your group will be
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directed to a tic-tac-toe board similar to this to wait until the round can continue. There are
no earnings for tic-tac-toe.
Please press continue. You will see the summary screen of the auction here. The blue player
placed the two highest bids and won both units at a price of 0, which was the third highest
bid of the group. The last line of this screen for both players will indicate the number of units
available for trade which in this example will be 2.
Please press continue to enter into the resale market for this example.
(see resale screenshot in 1S instructions)
The screen for resale is now slightly di¤erent from the last example as the market has changed.
In this example, the Green player is only in the market with the one blue player who won both
units and so there is now only one market open instead of two. Notice that in addition to the
o¤er price, you must now also input the number of units to trade: 1 or 2. Below the units input,
you will again be asked to submit an o¤er. The o¤er will always be per unit, but both units
can be traded together. For example, please now input 2 and an o¤er of 70, then click MAKE
OFFER. If this o¤er was accepted by the other participant, the total resale price would be
140. It is also possible to sell one unit at a time by inputting 1 unit instead of 2.
In all resale stages, you will have the option to exit before a trade is made. Please press the
EXIT RESALE button to leave the resale market.
You can now see the standard results screen for this example notice there are no resale
earnings, because no units were traded in resale. Please press continue.
Are there any questions? We are about to begin the actual auctions that you will be paid
for. You will now begin the paid rounds. You are participating at your own pace. Please follow
the on screen instructions. Please also make sure that when a continue button is available, you
click it whenever you are ready so the experiment can continue.
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